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Abstract 
This paper seeks to advance debates about the financialization of housing by focusing on 
the emergence of rental housing as a frontier for financialization, a dynamic that is 
increasingly relevant since the global financial crisis. Situated in New York City, the research 
focuses on an aggressive wave of investment in affordable, rent-stabilized properties by 
private equity firms, their efforts to release value from these properties, and the implications 
of the 2008 financial crisis for their investment strategies and thus for tenants’ experience of 
home. Through detailed empirical analysis tracing the connections between how rental 
housing has been constituted as a new site for private equity investment globally, the local 
conditions facilitating this process in New York, and how it reshaped everyday life for 
tenants, the article theorizes tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization. Yet 
unwillingness does not necessarily translate to being overtaken; it also connotes reluctance, 
and indeed struggle. This novel conceptualization highlights the ways in which 
financialization meets with dissent, and its necessarily contingent and incomplete nature. 
The paper therefore moves forward the wider intellectual project of understanding 
financialization not as a monolithic and inevitable process, but as one characterized by 
resistance from without and contradiction from within. 
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Introduction 
The US foreclosure crisis and global economic downturn it ignited in 2008 brought attention 
to low- and moderate-income families’ dwellings and neighborhoods as sites of capital 
extraction for global investors (cf. Newman, 2009; Sassen, 2009). Indeed while financial 
capital is integral to the urban process, including residential real estate (Aalbers and 
Christophers, 2014; Harvey, 1985; Moreno, 2014), the crisis underlined how the imperatives 
of accumulation often cultivate boom-and-bust cycles of real estate speculation by financial 
interests (Wissoker et al., 2014). Urban space and residential real estate represent prime 
sources of the ongoing supply of assets on which financial capital depends to generate new 
income streams (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007), but the hunt for yield also entails increasingly 
risky strategies that can trigger a wider asset crash. Financialization has increasingly drawn 
together the fates of households and local housing markets and global capital markets. The 
crisis-prone nature of this link influences the tenor of life at home in ways that reflect and 
reproduce broader inequalities in the social relations of housing, as when predatory 
mortgage lending practices disproportionately infuse the home life of women, people of 
color, and low-income families with stress and insecurity (Cuevas, 2012; Saegert et al., 
2009; Wyly et al., 2012). 
The bulk of research dealing with the financialization of housing addresses home 
ownership. But today rental housing constitutes an important new node for financializing 
projects globally, most noticeably in the US single-family market and other markets suffering 
extreme real estate downturns due to the global financial crisis, including Spain and Ireland 
(Beswick et al, 2016; Mendez and Pellicer, 2013). Private equity funds have taken 
advantage of steep discounts, surging rental demand, and constrained mortgage credit to 
buy distressed real estate assets, convert them to rental housing, and roll out novel rent-
backed financial instruments (Fields et al., 2016). Tenants’ homes may be subject to 
financialization though residents themselves do not hold mortgages.  This paper explores 
the emergence of rental housing as a new frontier for financialization, how this process 
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unfolded the years leading up to and immediately after the 2008 financial crisis in New York 
City, and how it reshaped tenants’ social, emotional and embodied experience of home. 
Whereas private equity firms only discovered single-family rental after the 2008 
financial crisis, they made a big entrance to New York City’s rental market in the years 
leading up to the crisis. New York has been characterized as a testing ground for neoliberal 
urban restructuring, experimentation made possible by its 1970s fiscal crisis (Harvey, 2005; 
Moody, 2007). Three decades later, the city’s mid-2000s real estate boom, together with the 
incomplete dismantling of postwar-era state rent protections in the 1990s, created the 
conditions for another round of experimentation. Under these conditions, private equity firms, 
in concert with local banks and landlords, set about transforming the city’s rent-regulated 
housing1 into a novel asset class for capital in need of investment opportunities, subjecting 
tenants to harassment, displacement, and unsafe living conditions to extract financial yield. 
Staged in the heart of global finance, this experiment, which housing advocates soon 
dubbed “predatory equity”, represents an important step toward incorporating rental housing 
into global circuits of capital. Considering its outcomes will therefore advance thinking about 
the financialization of rental housing more generally. 
Drawing on New York City’s experience of private equity investment in its affordable 
rental sector, this paper develops the linkages among rental housing as a new frontier for 
private equity funds globally, the local conditions facilitating this process, and the 
experiences of tenants as subjects of financialization. In the remainder of this paper I first 
address the changing political economy of housing in the context of financialization, how the 
retreat of the welfare state in advanced economies has opened up opportunities for 
financializing affordable rental housing globally, and the transformation of New York’s rent-
regulated housing from financial backwater to frontier for capital from the 1990s through the 
early to mid-2000s. I then discuss tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization, and how 
this process transforms the social relations of home. After an overview of methods and data, 
                                                
1 Rent regulations help tenants in the city’s older (built before 1974) multifamily (6 or more units) rental housing 
assert claims on space by protecting them from unpredictable rent increases and giving them the right to renew 
their leases, a process I explain in more detail later in the paper. 
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I show how the financialization of rent-regulated housing proceeded during the mid-2000s 
boom years, how the 2008 financial crisis tipped many such investments into financial 
distress, and the resulting impacts on tenants.  
Taking inspiration from Langley’s (2007) account of “uncertain” middle-class subjects 
of financialization, I conclude by reflecting on tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization, 
swept into the process without their consent. Predatory equity deals relied on “voodoo 
economics” (Christophers, 2010): the fallacy of neatly extracting financial value without 
disturbing the use values with which it is inevitably and inextricably enmeshed. The 
investments appear to exemplify Sassen’s (2014a) thesis that advanced capitalism seeks to 
‘cast ordinary people out of what had been their lives’. Yet Sassen (2014b), locating 
contemporary expulsions and dispossessions in the breakdown of Keynesian capitalism, 
neglects today’s existing opportunities for contestation and transformation (Gillespie, 2015). 
In contrast, Hodkinson (2012) reveals enclosure (the other side of the expulsion coin, the 
canvas for accumulation achieved through expulsion) as an ongoing capitalist process, 
arguing “capital must enclose because we are continuously resisting and moving outside its 
logic” (p. 515). This perspective supports understanding financialization as a fragmented and 
incomplete project (Langley, 2008) rather than a top-down and hegemonic one. 
Consequently when I speak of tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization, I emphasize 
unwillingness not just as lack of consent, but also refusal. This moves us toward an 
understanding of how financialization generates subjectivities of dissent through collective 
lived experiences. 
Rental housing as new global frontier for financialization 
Since the 1990s and 2000s liberalized national financial markets and advances in 
telecommunications have afforded unprecedented levels of global capital mobility and 
integration of financial markets (Harvey, 2010; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Stockhammer, 
2010). Financial products including real estate investment trusts, allowing investors to buy 
shares of real estate on public exchanges, and mortgage securitization, offering the ability to 
buy a share of future income from bundled mortgage payments, have gone mainstream and 
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global. By opening real estate investment to actors (such as sovereign wealth funds and 
pension funds) without knowledge of local market conditions these developments transform 
the political economy of housing. That is, institutional investors can take advantage of real 
estate investment opportunities at a global scale, capitalizing on advantageous market 
conditions wherever they may exist. In the low-yield, high liquidity global economic context of 
the mid-2000s, it was institutional investors’ search for yield via real estate-backed financial 
products such as mortgage derivatives that helped fuel the subprime mortgage crisis of 
2007-2008 (Ashton, 2009; Newman, 2009). 
 In tandem with the globalization and financialization of real estate, states have 
offloaded responsibility for affordable rental housing to the market. For advanced capitalist 
states, subsidizing or regulating rental housing may not offer a strategic advantage: in 
Sassen’s (2014b) view, the transition from industrial to advanced capitalism has devalued 
people as workers and consumers because accumulation is no longer organized around 
mass production and mass consumption. Many advanced capitalist nations have scaled 
back social welfare, limiting the “availability and desirability of socialized housing” (Roberts, 
2013, p. 23) through neglect and undermaintenance, demolition, privatization, and 
deregulation (Aalbers and Holm, 2008; Crump, 2002; Turner and Whitehead, 2002; Wyly et 
al., 2010). As a replacement for social welfare, asset-based welfare, particularly 
homeownership, serves the needs of financial capitalism by providing a steady stream of 
debtors attempting to secure their futures, and thus the raw materials for mortgage-backed 
securities (Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2014; Newman, 2009; Roberts, 2013).  
The shift of social housing to the private market has also created opportunities for 
financialization within the rental sector. Privatization of German public housing companies in 
the 1990s led to entire portfolios being transferred to private equity firms (Bernt, in press 
Fields and Uffer, 2016). Meanwhile loosened state regulations have allowed social housing 
associations in the Netherlands to use their real estate holdings and rental income as 
collateral for complex investments in financial instruments (Aalbers et al., in press). The 
financialization of homeownership ensured homes could become “a site of accumulation and 
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an object of leveraged investment” (Allon, 2010, p. 368; Langley, 2007; Martin, 2002). But 
these examples confirm that even a resource like affordable rental housing, which has 
historically offered some security against unfettered market forces, is not impermeable to 
similar financial accumulation strategies. They also highlight how efforts to transform rental 
housing into an investment object for finance capital are geographically and historically 
contingent, shaped in part by local institutional contexts, processes I to which I now turn.  
Rent-stabilized housing: from financial backwater to frontier for capital 
The mid-2000s explosion of global liquidity led investors to higher risk and 
opportunistic strategies, fueling a private equity boom (Acharya et al., 2007). Pressured to 
find new deals, private equity firms paid inflated prices for companies they loaded with debt 
just ahead of the 2008 crisis (Blundell-Wignall, 2007; Creswell, 2008). This dynamic also 
characterizes private equity’s mid-2000s entrance into New York’s rent-stabilized housing. In 
an example of the financialization of a non-financial sector (cf. Aalbers, in press), firms 
acquired thousands of large, old multifamily buildings, pursuing “value-added” and/or 
“opportunistic” private equity real estate investment strategies. These strategies emphasize 
high rates of return (12-18% for value-added, 18%+ for opportunistic) through rent growth 
(value-added) and heavy leverage (opportunistic) (Kaiser, 2005; Shilling and Wurtzebach, 
2012).2  But without the partial deregulation of rent-regulated housing, it is unlikely private 
equity firms would have seen the possibility to liberate value “trapped” within the properties. 
New York State rent regulations have been in place since the 1940s. They apply only 
during a “housing emergency” (defined as a vacancy rate of less than 5%), but are an 
enduring feature of the New York City housing landscape because of its historically tight 
rental market (New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 1993). 
Regulations on rent-controlled and rent-stabilized units3 mediate between tenants seeking 
                                                
2 Without access to investment prospectuses, it is difficult to definitively classify the strategies of firms entering 
the rent-regulated market in New York City; it is likely that both value-added and opportunistic strategies were in 
play and that the boundaries between the styles are fuzzy (cf. Kaiser, 2005). 
3 Rent control is an older system of rent regulations applying to apartments in multiunit buildings constructed 
before 1947 and in which the tenant as been in continuous residence since before 1971. Today there are fewer 
than 40,000 rent-controlled apartments in New York City. The more recent and larger system of rent-stabilization 
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secure tenure, habitability, and protection from excessive rent increases, and property 
owners seeking a return on their investment (Collins, 2014). Tenant and landlord advocates 
on the Rent Guidelines Board Rent set increases for rent-stabilized units (45% of the city’s 
private rental stock, nearly a million units as of 2011) annually. For low- and moderate-
income renters, the regulations make an otherwise unaffordable market more bearable, 
giving them a claim to space in a city the last mayor sought to position as a luxury product 
(cf. Brash, 2011). The limits on rent increases that make rent-stabilized housing a haven 
from the market also historically made it a low-pressure, low-competition “financial 
backwater”: annual returns are low but relatively stable, encouraging long-term ownership 
rather than the short-termism more characteristic of private equity funds (Association for 
Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009, p. 7, hereafter ANHD). 
The possibility for this financial backwater to become an investment object for private 
equity firms is linked to the state’s changing stake in social reproduction. After the urban 
crisis of the 1970s and turbulent 1980s, capital began to flow back into New York’s urban 
core in the 1990s as housing and neighborhood conditions improved (in large part due to 
significant public expenditure on rehabilitation of vacant and abandoned land and housing, 
cf. Schill et al., 2002) and the financial and business services sectors grew. However 
advocates of making government smaller, more efficient, and more entrepreneurial viewed 
the state as slow to adapt to the city’s changing market context, and thus an obstacle to 
further capital investment (Allred, 2000; Andersen, 1995).  
Framing rent regulations as a symbol of big government, the real estate sector 
successfully lobbied to scale back the state-level laws, with Republican lawmakers 
extracting key decontrol provisions when rent regulations were up for renewal in 1993 
(Dreier and Pitcoff, 1997). The most important provision was high rent/vacancy decontrol, 
under which units renting for $2000 or more upon vacancy4 may be deregulated entirely to 
                                                                                                                                                  
applies to multiunit buildings constructed between 1947 and 1971, or those built before 1947 where tenants 
moved in after 1971. This paper focuses on rent stabilized buildings. 	
4 This ceiling was raised to $2500 in 2011 and $2700 in 2015. 
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rent at whatever rate the market will bear. In 1997, the price of extending rent regulation 
laws at all was the institution of allowances entitling landlords to increase rents by 20% upon 
vacancy (more when longtime tenants depart) (Collins, 2014).5  
The 1990s weakening of rent regulations was positioned just ahead of the dual 
surge, from 2000-2008, of new residential development (much of it luxury housing) and 
home mortgage financing (particularly subprime loans). Made possible, respectively, by 
extensive rezoning under the Bloomberg mayoral administration (Brash, 2011) and 
expanded credit and loosened underwriting nationally, these trends “pressured and 
surrounded the city’s low-cost rental market” with “overheated, highly leveraged ownership” 
(Wyly et al., 2010, p. 2611). Meanwhile, deregulation of rent-stabilized units had become a 
viable reality, and vacancy bonuses provided a mechanism to move rents toward 
deregulation and onto the open market.  
The 2000s development and mortgage booms and the partial deregulation of rent 
protections in the 1990s therefore worked in synergy, transforming rent-regulated housing 
from financial backwater to frontier for capital (see Bernt, in press, for further discussion of 
interactions between financialization and local and national state restructuring). The former 
brought opportunities to circulate capital through the built environment near saturation point; 
the latter attracted new financial actors motivated to release value from buildings where legal 
protections that kept rents below market rates had been softened. From the perspective of 
private equity firms, possibly emboldened by a local political context that privileged corporate 
and financial interests, (cf. Brash, 2011), rent-stabilized properties represented an 
underperforming asset they could release or redevelop for enhanced yield. Of course, as 
Christophers (2010) argues, this is a mystification that obscures how these assets are 
“messily entangled with everyday use” (p. 102); financializing projects proceed by such 
mystifications. 
 
 
                                                
5 Vacancy allowances and bonuses were significantly limited in 2015.  
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Unwilling subjects of financialization 
The space between underperformance and enhanced yield for asset managers is 
also the space between stable and precarious housing for tenants in rent-stabilized 
buildings. The investment strategy that came to be known as predatory equity shows how 
financialization can incorporate even spaces and populations heretofore difficult to enroll in 
finance, such as rental housing and tenants. While the rise of finance and the turn toward 
asset-based welfare has increasingly normalized investment and calculation as part of 
everyday life for the middle class and its aspirants (Martin, 2002), the loss of homes in the 
foreclosure crisis underlines how “uncertain” these subjects of financialization are: their 
performance as investors is easily compromised by needs called into being by identities as 
parents, caretakers, and providers (cf. Langley, 2007, 2008). As financialization encloses 
new territories, these processes of subjectification also shift. Unlike homeowners, tenants 
are not merely uncertain subjects of financialization, but unwilling ones, almost incidental to 
a process taking place without their knowledge or consent. 
The effort to extract yield by closing the space between tenants’ security and 
precarity speaks to the role stable housing plays in self-identity and well-being. The threat of 
losing one’s housing undermines its defining features as material context for familial life and 
everyday activities, site of refuge and control, and identity and social status constructed in 
and through the home (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998; Hiscock et al., 2001; Saegert et al., 2009). 
In other words, housing made precarious contradicts the very ontology of home, putting well-
being at risk by de-stabilizing that which “gives shape and meaning to people’s everyday 
lives” (Imrie, 2004, p. 746). This draws our attention to how normative traditional 
associations of home with rootedness, belonging, and comfort are—and their neglect of how 
home is often the site of fear, alienation, and ambivalence (Blunt and Varley, 2004; Manzo, 
2003). Further, the ability to have (or provide) a home conforming with this normative 
ontology of home is heavily contingent on race, gender, class and geographic location. Thus 
predatory equity investments represent precarity and alienation both at the scale of 
individual relationships with home, and in a broader sense: to treat this affordable housing 
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resource as a financial asset is to further fray the already tenuous claims the working poor 
have on place in New York, and thus their place in the city. In the remainder of this paper, I 
detail how and where predatory equity unfolded in the boom years before the 2008 crisis, 
the downturn such deals took afterwards, and how this reshaped tenants’ social, emotional 
and embodied experience of home. But first, an overview of the methods and data informing 
this account of rental housing as a new frontier for financialization.  
Research context 
The three subsequent empirical sections incorporate several primary and secondary data 
sources.  The first section relays how predatory equity unfolded by drawing on reports 
produced by community-based organizations, including the Association for Neighborhood 
and Housing Development (ANHD), the University Neighborhood Housing Program (UNHP), 
and the Center for Urban Pedagogy in conjunction with the Urban Homesteading Assistance 
Board (UHAB) and Tenants Together. These groups were at the forefront of building 
awareness of predatory equity and worked closely with affected tenants. This section also 
maps the geography of predatory equity with primary data from the Overleveraged Property 
Database, provided by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. The database includes 
approximately 1100 buildings UHAB and ANHD identified as over-leveraged, i.e. indebted 
beyond what rental income could support. Built from the ground up based on grassroots 
efforts to track market activity, research property owners, and organize tenants, the 
database is necessarily incomplete and includes not only private equity owners, but a 
broader group of landlords engaged in irresponsible real estate practices. Nevertheless it 
remains the best measure of a difficult to measure phenomenon (see Fields, 2015). 
The second empirical section uses primary data to highlight changes in property 
distress from 2008 to 2010 for all multifamily properties in New York City, properties in 
neighborhoods with a high prevalence of overleveraged buildings, and properties directly 
affected by overleveraging. The data comes from the Building Indicator Project (BIP), a 
holistic measure of distress in multifamily properties based on public data on housing code 
violations and property liens. UNHP developed the BIP to monitor the status of affordable 
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multifamily housing as real estate prices started rising in the early 2000s (UNHP, 2011). BIP 
data from 2008 to 2010 cross-referenced with the Overleveraged Properties Database 
shows how the financial crisis affected distress levels of rent-regulated properties purchased 
by predatory investors. This section also includes a case study of the Ocelot portfolio, a 
group of 25 Bronx buildings a private equity firm purchased immediately before the crisis, 
and which unraveled after 2008. The case study shows how financialization prolonged 
tenants’ suffering in the aftermath of the crisis.  
The final empirical section draws on three focus groups conducted in 2011 with 14 
tenants of a group of Bronx buildings private equity real estate firm Milbank purchased in 
2007, and which went into foreclosure in 2009. As a method that promotes interaction and 
exchange through participants’ conversations about their shared experience (Morgan, 1995; 
Wilkinson, 1999), focus groups mirrored the meetings of the tenants association (to which 
most participants belonged) where tenants discussed the issues they faced and debated 
how to act on their situation. With participants’ buildings in physical and financial distress in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the aim of the focus groups was to understand how the 
unraveling of these investments affected tenants’ social, emotional, and embodied 
experience of home. Representing six of the18 Milbank portfolio buildings, all participants 
were Black (five participants) or Hispanic (nine participants) and 10 were female. 
Participants ranged from 25-75 years old, with a median age of 41. While some participants 
had only moved in since 2008, others were longtime residents of 25 years or more. I 
analyzed the focus group transcripts for themes relating to the material and socio-emotional 
characteristics of the home, and how these aspects of housing connected to health and 
family and social relationships. 
The entrance of private equity 
Private equity firms began to aggressively target the city’s rent-stabilized housing around 
2005, part of the larger private equity boom riding a wave of low-interest credit and an 
“unprecedented supply of leverage” supplied by petrodollars, Asian government surpluses, 
and pension, foundation and private wealth (Acharya et al., 2007, p. 46). Firms like Milbank 
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Real Estate, a firm typically more given to commercial and retail than residential 
opportunities, framed New York’s last bastions of affordable rent as “positioned to undergo 
significant gentrification” (Milbank Real Estate, 2007). They identified poorly managed rent-
stabilized properties as assets that would have “added value for investors” after infusing 
capital and “aggressively pursuing the collection of past-due rents” to improve the tenant 
base and increase rental income (Milbank Real Estate, 2007). Firms such as Ocelot Capital 
Group, Dawnay Day, SG2, Apollo, and BlackRock Realty Advisors also assembled portfolios 
of rent-stabilized properties in large package deals, often by taking over portfolios of 
operators who spent decades amassing large property holdings and cashed out at the 
height of the market (Haughney, 2009). 
Affordable housing advocates estimate private equity firms purchased 100,000 units, 
or about 10% of the city’s rent-regulated housing between 2005 and 2009 (ANHD, 2009). 
Expectations of increased rental income like those outlined on Milbank’s website inflated 
purchase prices beyond even the booming property values characterizing the mid-2000s, 
loading properties with high levels of debt. An analysis of ten major portfolios covering 
27,000 rental units involved in such deals found an average of only 55 cents of income for 
every dollar of debt service (ANHD, 2009), suggesting the pursuit of opportunistic investment 
strategies. Mortgages in such cases were underwritten “pro forma”, or based on projected 
income growth rather than historical or current rates of return (Teresa, 2016; University 
Neighborhood Housing Program, 2011). Investors sought to release untapped value by 
closing the gap between lower, stabilized rents and higher, market-rate prices. Meeting 
expectations for income growth required repositioning properties by promoting tenant 
attrition and upgrading units until they were released from rent regulations (Center for Urban 
Pedagogy, 2009). 
Predatory equity strategy exemplifies how capital market expectations for asset 
growth are frequently incompatible with single-digit growth in real product markets (Froud et 
al., 2000, cited in Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). Whereas double-digit yield targets and a short 
time frame (as short as three years in the case of opportunistic funds) characterize real 
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estate private equity (Ernst & Young, 2002), annual returns on rent-stabilized properties are 
generally no more than 7-8% due to regulations on rent increases (ANHD, 2009). Extracting 
larger returns over a shorter time frame would depend on increasing rents to the point of 
deregulating stabilized units, either by passing on the cost of major capital improvements to 
tenants or garnering vacancy bonuses.  While turnover of rent-stabilized units is typically 5-
10% per year, many deals assumed tenant turnover rates of 20% to more than 30% a year 
(ANHD, 2009). Meeting these investment objectives would entail significant disruption to 
tenants’ lives and fragmentation of social communities anchored by longtime residents.  
Indeed, as private equity funds made headway into the rent-regulated sector, 
community-based organizations confronted rising harassment complaints from tenants in the 
neighborhoods targeted for investment, including parts of upper Manhattan, the west Bronx, 
and central and south Brooklyn (see Figure 1). With rent-stabilized tenants standing in the 
way of projected returns, investors sought to promote attrition and secure vacancy bonuses 
by refusing to make repairs inside units, issuing building-wide eviction notices and baseless 
lawsuits for unpaid rent, making aggressive buy-out offers, and threatening to call 
immigration authorities (ANHD, 2009; Morgenson, 2008; Powell, 2011). Housing advocates 
termed the investments “predatory equity” to highlight the actors involved, their aggressive 
tactics, and the extractive nature of investments that depended on reducing the stock of 
affordable rental housing in a city where half of tenants are burdened by housing costs 
(Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2014). Predatory equity may therefore be 
considered an effort to generate capitalist wealth by ‘plundering the very spaces of existence 
of the working poor’ (Wright, 2014, p. 3).  
 
[FIGURE 1: Percent of rental units overleveraged due to private equity investment as 
of 2011, New York City sub-borough districts] 
 
Figure 1 caption: Prevalence of overleveraged private equity investments in NYC rental properties, 
2011. Data sources: overleveraged properties database, Local Initiatives Support Corporation; 
occupied rental units, New York City 2008 Housing and Vacancy Survey. 
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A crisis of excess finance capital  
Once the 2008 financial crisis hit, many funds could (or would) not cover both debt 
service and property maintenance, particularly as price declines and the credit freeze made 
refinancing untenable. Several large portfolios went into foreclosure, effectively abandoned 
by their private equity owners.  Harassment and undermaintenance gave way to rapid, 
extreme property deterioration. As one tenant organizer described, before the financial crisis 
bad conditions were clearly a tactic to induce tenant turnover, but after 2008, conditions 
deteriorated quickly as firms ran out of money and faced heightened scrutiny from city 
agencies (prompted by complaints of tenant harassment). Tightened credit and heightened 
financial strain increased the rate of distress (as measured by BIP data) from 2.8% to 5.5% 
of all multifamily properties in the city between 2008 and 2010, but neighborhoods and 
properties affected by predatory equity started off with higher rates of distress and 
experienced much greater increases in distress. In the 11 neighborhoods with the highest 
prevalence of predatory equity investments, the distress rate for multifamily properties 
increased from 4.3% to 9.6% from 2008 to 2010. But within those neighborhoods, the rate of 
distress on properties directly affected by highly-leveraged purchases skyrocketed from 7% 
to 21% over the same period (see figure 2). 
 
[FIGURE 2: Changes in percent of NYC multifamily buildings in physical and financial 
distress from 2008 to 2010] 
 
Figure 2 caption: Changes in multifamily distress as measured by property liens and housing code 
violations. Data sources: LISC overleveraged properties database and Building Indicator Project. 
 
These data suggest investors may have targeted poorly maintained and managed 
properties—a relic of earlier generations of landlords, who profited from lax documentation 
and leasing, overlooking tenants whose names weren’t on the lease in exchange for a 
steady stream of rent payments and residents keeping quiet about skimpy maintenance and 
repairs. In this sense the deals correspond to an opportunistic real estate private equity 
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strategy of acquiring distressed assets. The history of poor management of rent-stabilized 
properties was a resource private equity firms could use to enhance yield, often in illegal 
ways, e.g. systematic harassment to promote tenant attrition. The neighborhoods targeted 
most heavily for investment are predominantly African-American and Hispanic (80% of 
residents from high-prevalence neighborhoods came from one of these minority groups, 
compared to about half of New York City as a whole) and low income (across high-
prevalence neighborhoods, the median income was below 200% of poverty). Consequently 
the impact of predatory equity fell most heavily on poor neighborhoods of color. Residents of 
directly affected buildings experienced several waves of exploitation: first, poor property 
maintenance and disrepair under earlier owners; second, a forcible effort, guised as 
revitalization, to subvert the legal protections allowing them to remain there; finally, after the 
financial crisis, a new threat to their claim to space as those unwilling or unable to move saw 
their homes crumbled around them.  
Three decades after disinvestment and urban capital flight transformed the city’s 
rental housing into a landscape of burned-out, abandoned, and deteriorated buildings, some 
buildings physically resembled those of the 1970s. However this time the crisis was caused 
not by capital flight, but an excess of finance capital. Unlike the 1970s, properties affected by 
predatory equity were not only physically distressed, they were also weighed down by multi-
million dollar mortgages. Divergent responses to this financial distress ultimately prolonged 
the time tenants spent in a precarious housing situation in two ways.  
 The first occurred as “good actors” like community-based developers and affordable 
housing companies sought to assume ownership of distressed buildings for preservation as 
affordable housing. This process takes years, requiring the ability to leverage large amounts 
of capital, buy and complete foreclosure on the distressed mortgage, and rehabilitate the 
properties (Fields, 2015). In 2006 New York-based Ocelot Capital group bought a group of 
25 Bronx buildings for $39M with Israeli private equity backing and financing from Deutsche 
Bank and Dime Savings Bank, but by 2007 “virtually all services came to a complete stop” 
as the debt proved unsupportable and Ocelot went bankrupt  (Levy, 2011). Left  holding a 
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$29M Deutsche Bank mortgage on 19 properties (Dime Savings Bank held another loan on 
six remaining buildings), Fannie Mae initiated foreclosure proceedings in early 2009. Public 
pressure from tenant advocates and local politicians prevented Fannie Mae from auctioning 
the distressed mortgage on Debt-X, an online debt trading site for large financial institutions 
and institutional investors. Once the city stepped in with rehabilitation funds, Fannie Mae 
agreed to take a substantial loss on a sale to a preservation buyer, and in 2010, 14 of the 19 
buildings were transferred to for-profit affordable housing company Omni New York (Fields, 
2015). Omni purchased the debt for $5M (a discount of more than $20M), agreeing to 
rehabilitate the properties and adhere to affordability requirements for 40 years (Levy, 2011). 
Although technically a “win”, in this scenario tenants were subject to inhumane living 
conditions and kept in limbo for years as government agencies, community housing 
advocates, and financial institutions debated how best to dispose of unsustainable debt. 
However, distressed mortgages also became objects of speculation for “vulture 
funds” purchasing debt at a discount. This high-risk but potentially high-payoff investment 
strategy hinges on funds turning the entreprise around or reselling the debt at a markup. 
While beneficial for banks able to unload distressed debt and attractive for investors, this 
process heightened and prolonged the precarity of tenants’ existence. In 2009 Dime Savings 
Bank transferred $13.5 million of distressed debt on six of the Ocelot portfolio properties 
(containing 260 dwellings) at face value to Hunter, a property management company backed 
by a Japanese private equity fund, which soon began to buckle under the weight of the 
mortgage (Levy, 2011). After Hunter defaulted on the mortgage in 2010, the debt changed 
hands again, going to the Bluestone Group for $10M; despite the 26% discount from the 
debt’s face value, the price generated concerns Bluestone would be unable to fund repairs 
at the properties, which then had 2,936 outstanding housing code violations (Massey and 
Fung, 2010).  
But Bluestone didn’t intend to hold on to the debt, marketing it as $16M less than a 
year later despite the properties’ 1,384 outstanding housing code violations (Massey and 
Fung, 2011). Though clearing another 1000 violations by the time the debt (and thus the 
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properties) sold to a local landlord for $18M (a 30% markup from the original $13.5 million 
mortgage), Bluestone did little to address the properties’ underlying, systemic problems 
(Pincus, 2011). By this point, tenants remaining at the six buildings had been exposed to 
dangerous, nearly uninhabitable living conditions for over three years, and were fearful the 
purchase price would prevent the new owner from addressing major systems in dire need of 
repair (Chiwaya et al., 2011). This case underlines how the divergence between the 
exchange value of housing-backed financial assets and the use value of housing itself 
exposes the working poor to violence that contradicts their ability to carry out their everyday 
existence.  I now turn to a more detailed examination of tenants’ experience as investments 
fell apart in the post-2008 context, focusing on the Milbank portfolio. 
A struggle for everyday existence 
In 2007 Milbank Real Estate purchased 18 buildings in the Kingsbridge area of the 
northwest Bronx with a $35M mortgage from Deutsche Bank. The loan was securitized and 
sold on to La Salle Bank after origination, then sold to Wells Fargo Bank in 2008. By March 
2009 Milbank defaulted on their mortgage obligations. Based on the terms of the security’s 
pooling and service agreement LNR Property Corporation became special servicer for the 
debt, foreclosure proceedings began, and the court appointed a receiver for the properties. 
While the buildings were by then in an extreme state of disrepair, it took a needs 
assessment finding it would cost $19M to restore livable conditions (Baer Architecture 
Group, 2010), a subpoena from the city for information on ownership, management, and 
maintenance, and an order from the Bronx Supreme Court before LNR devoted $2.5M 
toward repairs in 2010  (Barbanel, 2010). The city’s Department of Housing Preservation 
and Development also filed liens against the properties for $80,000 of public funds spent on 
emergency repairs. In February 2011 Scarsdale, NY landlord Steven Finkelstein purchased 
the properties for $28M, assessing they needed only $6.8M in rehabilitation. I held focus 
groups with Milbank tenants in the spring and summer of 2011, as Finkelstein was taking 
control of the properties. 
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In line with the quantitative data on property distress cited in the preceding section, 
longtime residents noted their buildings experienced inept management under various 
owners since the 1980s, but that a wholesale deterioration in their living conditions began 
just after the financial crisis. Participants had the impression Milbank was poorly run at best 
or exploitative at worst: the company sometimes told tenants they hadn’t received their rent 
checks when in fact they had already cashed them, and while Milbank management told 
tenants they were “trying to get the books together to give us heat and hot water and do the 
necessary repairs that had to be done”, the repairs never happened. Participants marked the 
winter of 2009-2010 as the low point of their experience, when they often went for weeks 
without heat or hot water. As a result they were prevented from carrying out basic tasks of 
life: “You come home, and you’re frustrated already because for the last three days you 
haven’t been able to take a decent bath...you really don’t want to turn around and have to 
warm up water to carry it to the bathroom to wash up”. The lack of heat and hot water meant 
home was incompatible with rest and relaxation: “You can’t be comfortable—you don’t even 
have an apartment where you can go and listen to music because it’s so freezing in the 
house”. Many relied on friends and family members to provide a warm place to sleep or hot 
water for showers, experiencing this time as both miserable and infuriating. 
It was common for ceilings to cave in due to water damage, and for gaps and holes 
in walls to go unrepaired, allowing infestations of rats, mice and cockroaches to spread 
easily. A young man living with his mother and sister described how wearying it was for his 
family to adjust their routines to accommodate this deterioration: “Always have to be buying 
mousetraps, and putting them all around in the kitchen, in the hallways, so that was very, 
very tiring…you can’t even leave food, to this day, on top of the stove because rats come in 
through the stove.” Another participant explained how unpredictable elevator service 
intersected with her asthma to complicate basic errands: “I’m on the fifth floor, so when we 
didn’t have the elevator, that got tiring. I’m an asthmatic. That killed me some days to walk 
up and down the stairs…I couldn’t go food shopping properly, because I couldn’t do anything 
properly”.  Elevator service also affected the mobility of elderly tenants: “I use a cane…You 
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come downstairs on the elevator—‘oh, I can go shopping’—go shopping, come back, and no 
elevator”, and those with physical disabilities: “The lady upstairs has a son in a wheelchair. 
She has to bring him down the stairs for school…a lady, carrying her son down the stairs 
because the elevators don’t work”. 
All Milbank tenants were more or less accustomed to some level of wear and tear in 
their housing: many had lived in the Bronx through its most intense years of disinvestment, 
and most reported incomes that would limit their housing options to the low end of the 
market. But even these seasoned tenants characterized their living conditions as 
inexcusable: “You always find with buildings that something breaks…they have a leak, or got 
some walls falling, things deteriorate, and that’s understandable…what happened in my 
building, none of that should have happened. That’s too much”. At the same time, needing to 
keep a roof over their heads, many continued to pay rent, despite feeling “mad at the world” 
for the way they were living: participants’ low incomes and the high cost of housing and 
moving limited their options. Giving voice to the extractive nature of the investments, 
participants felt investors “just saw opportunity… all they want is the money, and take the 
money out of the neighborhood, out of the community, and they don’t spend nothing on any 
upkeep or nothing.” Home became something participants had to bear, certainly not a 
source of comfort, dignity, and respite from the world. Beyond this, they were also aware 
their experience was the result of investors viewing their humanity as incidental to meeting 
targets for yield. 
The collapse of financially unsustainable investments was borne out not just in burst 
pipes, electrical fires, and elevator failures, but in tenants’ physical health, kin relationships 
at home, and social relationships outside the home. In terms of physical health, those with 
asthma described flareups they attributed to mold and mildew from unrepaired leaks, 
infestations of rodents and other vermin, and increased dust, plaster and paint in the air from 
degraded walls and ceilings: “At one point I went to the emergency room…if those conditions 
weren’t there, then I probably wouldn’t have had to go to the emergency room, or my doctor 
several times”. Others also described family members developing symptoms of asthma. But 
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many participants and their families simply felt constantly sick and run down: “[My kids] 
always got some kind of cold or something, because those fumes or whatever, and the dust 
coming in...”  
The stresses accompanying these living conditions strained family relations and 
social relationships outside the home. Young people coped by staying away: “When a lot of 
that was happening, I wasn’t coming home a lot. I would stay out…I would hang out outside 
until 1:00 in the morning. I would sleep at my friend’s house…my mom would think that I was 
dabbling in drugs.”  One participant painted a vivid picture of how, after bathing with water 
he’d heated up himself, “smoke is coming out of your nose because you’re so frustrated… 
And there’s the fight, there’s the stress, there’s the arguments, there’s the destruction of 
family life.”  As difficulties with the most basic tasks of everyday life piled up, patience ran 
short, resulting in familial tensions. Tenants’ social relationships also began to break down. 
Not only did participants not want to be at home themselves, they didn’t want to invite friends 
into their homes: “I didn’t want to come home. I wouldn’t bring anyone to my house”. Others 
echoed this sentiment, feeling “ashamed” and “embarrassed to bring friends home, because 
the place is so falling down.”  
In the wreckage of investors’ efforts to transform rent-regulated housing into a new 
vehicle for capital accumulation, tenants felt powerless and stripped of dignity as they 
struggled to sustain the activities of everyday life. Whether remaining out of determination to 
assert their claim on space or a lack of other options, tenants faced daily challenges in 
caring for themselves and their families. This threatened their roles as parents, spouses, 
caretakers and providers, leading to frayed kin and social relations. The experiences of 
tenants affected by predatory equity link the global process of the financialization of rental 
housing with its on-the-ground consequences for life at home.  
Conclusions 
In many advanced capitalist economies, it is increasingly possible to treat rental housing that 
has historically given poor people a claim on urban space as a financial asset.  
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Connecting this global trend with how it has unfolded in a particular place, this paper 
examined the financialization of rent-regulated housing in New York City in the boom years 
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, and how the subsequent collapse of this wave of 
private equity buyouts subjected tenants to years of living in amidst inhumane living 
conditions and in limbo as to the fate of their homes. The piece advances the literature on 
the financialization of home at a moment when rental housing is emerging as a frontier for 
this process. By developing the ties between predatory investment strategies, the poor and 
minority neighborhoods they most affected, and how tenants experienced financialization on 
a bodily, emotional and relational level, this timely research moves the study of 
financialization beyond the sites and voices of financial elites (Pollard, 2012). 
Yet it is crucial to do so without treating “housing merely as a “commodity”” or 
reducing “relations between people--the people who own, build, rent, and live in houses...to 
the politically and analytically impoverished status of relationships between things” (Aalbers 
and Christophers, 2014, p. 7, emphasis in original). While the case of predatory equity can 
be read as a textbook example of an attempt to accumulate by dispossession, such a 
reading risks reifying finance as an inexorable force, subordinating social relations, and 
closing off potential for contesting and making conflict with financialization (Allon, 2010; 
Langley, 2008). To conclude then, I reflect on how financialization generates dissent by 
bringing the concepts of fictitious capital and voodoo economics (Christophers, 2010) and 
the value model on which private equity to bear on tenants as unwilling subjects of 
financialization. 
At the core of predatory equity investments was the conceit it would be possible to 
release, then extract value that (weakened) rent regulations trapped within apartment 
buildings, as seen in the framing of rent-stabilized apartments as “underperforming assets” 
that could generate value through being repositioned on the open market (Milbank Real 
Estate, 2007; Powell, 2011). These discourses exemplify Christophers’ (2010) contention of 
“voodoo economics”, or the mystification that it is easily possible to draw a “hard-and-fast 
line between properties and the acts of living in them” (p. 103). Voodoo economics enable 
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financializing policies and practices, such as, in this case, leveraging capital based on 
assumed tenant turnover rates that far outpaced reality in rent-stabilized units (20-30% vs. 5-
10% annually). Going further, as Teresa (2016) argues, like “all capital circulating through 
land”, the capital leveraged for predatory equity investments, based on anticipation of future 
rents yet to be extracted, “is inherently fictitious” (p. 468). In the contradiction at the heart of 
voodoo economics and the uncertainty that defines fictitious capital are sources of fragilities 
within the process of financialization and limits from without. Especially where capital gains 
are pursued through highly leveraged purchases, as with opportunistic real estate private 
equity strategies, falling prices spell catastrophic results (Christophers, 2015b). Such 
fragilities ensure financialization is not inevitable, but always a practical accomplishment in 
the making (Christophers, 2015a; Langley, 2008; Ouma, 2016).  
Indeed the dissolution of the speculative promise of fictitious capital in the wider 
financial crisis pulled back the curtain on the voodoo economics propelling predatory equity 
investments, revealing the dangers of reducing the urban landscape to a set of financial 
criteria. The inability of investors to meet mortgage obligations, struggles between different 
actors over how to best resolved troubled mortgages, and the targeting of the same troubled 
mortgages as investment objects by “vulture funds” all spilled over into renters’ lives, 
rendering home increasingly precarious and insecure. Subjecting spaces of everyday life 
and social reproduction to financial imperatives leaves urban inhabitants vulnerable to “the 
vicissitudes of the gains enterprise” (Christophers, 2015b, p. 11). In this sense we can 
understand tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization. Where Langley (2007) stresses 
the contradictions that make middle-class investors and homeowners uncertain subjects of 
financialization, here I emphasize how financializing practices constitute other segments of 
society as subjects without their knowledge or consent. However these attempts at 
enclosure are not always successful, and inevitably instantiate opposition (Hodkinson, 
2012). Unwillingness does not necessarily translate to being overtaken; it also connotes 
reluctance, opposition, and struggle.  
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As predatory equity deals failed and the brick and mortar properties attached to 
distressed loans deteriorated, political opportunities emerged. For example, in the face of 
Fannie Mae’s attempt to auction the Ocelot portfolio’s distressed mortgage debt tenants and 
community organizations insisted on the materiality of housing and its ontological status as 
home, conducting guided tours of deteriorated buildings for local politicians and posting 
signs warning speculators to stay away (Fields, 2015). Such direct actions to contest the 
financialization of home hinged on tenants’ collective experience of predatory equity and 
how these experiences brought their unwilling subjectivity into being: “They need to know 
that we are together. We’re going to work together, and we’re going to fight together”. Thus a 
defining element of tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization is shared exposure to 
and experiences of this process, which can cultivate a critical and oppositional 
consciousness that motivates coordinated action to disrupt financializing projects (cf. Colau 
and Alemany, 2014). The concept of tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization 
developed in this paper provides an entry point for analyses of how this process meets with 
dissent in the form of organized urban activism (for more in-depth analyses see Fields, 2015; 
Teresa, 2016). 
As financialization processes continue to colonize the spaces of everyday life in the 
wake of the global financial crisis, this research confirms social reproduction as a 
fundamental site for contemporary urban social struggles (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014; 
Harvey, 2012; Wright, 2014). Yet its rootedness in a specific time and place raises questions 
about the extent to which this case study can shed light on the broader financialization of 
rental housing taking place in the post-crisis landscape of the US and elsewhere. First, it 
must be noted that New York has a long history of tenant struggles and uprisings (Lawson 
and Johnson, 1986), and the infrastructure of community groups that emerged in response 
to the disinvestment of the 1970s played an important role in contesting predatory equity 
(Fields 2015; Teresa, 2016). The legacies of earlier struggles are ‘baked into’ the urban 
landscape politically and materially (such as the tenant-owned cooperatives created in New 
York’s earlier period of disinvestment); as such studies of the urban politics of 
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financialization must be adequately historicized. Second, the consequences of predatory 
equity are very much linked to the broader market context of a housing boom and the 
inflated prices investors paid; conditions quite different to the weakened housing market in 
which private equity firms are buying and renting out repossessed homes. This work 
highlights clearly how applying riskier value-added and opportunistic investment strategies to 
rental housing can have devastating consequences for tenants if the underlying asset is 
mismanaged or fails to appreciate, or if extreme economic events occur.  
More generally, this paper demonstrates how financialization is always contingent, as 
are the subjectivities it cultivates (Langley, 2007), pointing to the ever-present possibility for 
calling the process into question and building alternative political economies of housing. 
Here, one of the distinctive aspects of how finance capital pursues capital gains also 
suggests a potential limit to the financialization of rental housing. The construction of new 
asset classes relies on aggregation at “unmatched” scale (Christophers, 2015b, p. 10; 
Leyshon and Thrift, 2007), but while private equity landlords assemble rental portfolios of 
distressed real estate in the US and Spain, they are also aggregating unwilling subjects. 
Hence to operate at the scale needed to establish rental housing as an asset class is also to 
scale up contentious subjectivities, as last year’s coordination of three global days of action 
against private equity landlords by US and Spanish activists shows (McShane, 2015). Such 
struggles make clear the ways in which property—particularly housing--can only ever be, in 
Coakley’s (1994) terms, a quasi-financial asset: contestation over value will always limit the 
possibility for housing to be realized as a pure financial asset. 
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